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R&D Accounting Discretion as an Income Smoothing Tool: An Empirical Analysis of
German Listed Companies
Carina Brettschneider
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Abstract
Capitalization of development costs is compulsory according to IFRS if a set of criteria is fulfilled. However, this obligation
is considered as a de facto right for capitalization since the criteria are quite subjective, allowing for a certain degree of
flexibility. Hence, the question arises whether managers use research and development (R&D) accounting to conduct earnings
management in terms of income smoothing. Using a sample of German listed companies, the study conducts several regression
analyses to test whether there is a negative relationship between R&D capitalization and different income smoothing proxies.
Results show that the hypothesis is supported independent of the income smoothing proxy used. The study proofs that
managers indeed use R&D capitalization judgments to conduct income smoothing.
Keywords: R&D capitalization; income smoothing; earnings management; R&D accounting; development costs.
1. Introduction
“Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways
[. . . ] etc. [. . . ]. They are organs of the human brain, created
by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified”
(Marx, 1857).
What we currently observe as the transformation from a
manufacturing to a knowledge-based economy has already
been envisaged by Karl Marx in 1857. Digitalization and
globalization led to a technology-caused structural interrup-
tion that puts substantial pressure on current business models
and whole industries. This forces companies to heavily invest
in research and development (R&D) to remain competitive
and improve their businesses (Hoffmann, 2017). As reported
by the R&D Magazine’s current 2017 Global R&D Funding
Forecast, worldwide spending on R&D reaches $ 2.066 tril-
lion1, which represents 1.72 % of the global gross domestic
product (Industrial Research Institute, 2017).
This ongoing development has also been recognized by
German politics. The new coalition agreement (2018) in-
tends to introduce tax incentives to promote R&D invest-
ments. Additionally, 3.5 % of gross domestic product are
planned to spend on R&D until 2025 to support high-tech
strategies such as artificial intelligence (Koalitionsvertrag,
2018).
1Hereinafter, the thesis uses German notation of numbers.
Obviously, the transformation towards a R&D intensive
economy is also reflected in the companies’ financial state-
ments. According to a study conducted by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers GmbH in 2014, intangible assets determine 75 % of
a firm’s value (Hadjiloucas, 2014). Simultaneously, several
researchers denounce exhaustive sluggishness in R&D mea-
suring and reporting systems (Boulton et al., 2000). Nei-
ther literature nor standard setters can agree on a uniform
accounting treatment leading to a variety of different rules
among countries (Garanina et al., 2016). While some pre-
sume R&D capitalization to be value relevant signaling future
economic benefits, opponents condemn the loss of objectiv-
ity and the possible incentive for earnings management, de-
manding complete expensing of R&D (Lev and Sougiannis,
1996).
Following this debate, the thesis wants to assess whether
managers really use R&D capitalization opportunities to en-
gage in income smoothing in terms of accrual-based earnings
management. Since research on that topic does not lead to
a consistent result, the thesis contributes to previous litera-
ture by conducting an analysis in a setting of German listed
companies over a period of four years and across different
industries.
Section two introduces R&D accounting in Germany fo-
cusing mainly on International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards (IFRS). After discussing the trade-off between objec-
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tivity and relevance, focus shifts on earnings management
research and the income smoothing hypothesis. Whereas
section four reviews previous literature, the following chap-
ter develops the research hypothesis analyzed. Section six
and seven are concerned with research methodology and the
empirical data analysis that consists of a descriptive statistic,
correlation, regression and sensitivity analysis. In the end,
the thesis critically assesses the analysis made by pointing
out limitations and further research opportunities before
drawing a conclusion.
2. R&D accounting in Germany
2.1. Terminology, recognition and measurement
Introducing the Accounting Law Modernization Act in
Germany in 2009, legislature lifts the ban on capitalization of
self-generated intangibles assets as stated in § 248 (2) Ger-
man Commercial Code (HGB). Companies got the option to
recognize development expenses at acquisition costs while
research expenses are not allowed to be capitalized. Accord-
ing to HGB, development costs mainly include applied re-
search results or knowledge for further advancement or re-
cent developments, while research focuses on the search for
knowledge itself. If companies are not able to separate re-
search and development, they must account both as an ex-
pense (§ 255 (2a) HGB).
Since European International Accounting Standards
(IAS) regulation article 4 requires capital market orientated
companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements
in accordance to IFRS starting in 2005, it is not appropriate
to apply HGB when analyzing German listed companies.
Therefore, the thesis focuses on IFRS accounting principles.
Accounting for intangible assets including R&D is governed
in IAS 38 (Figure 1). In line with German legislation, IFRS
distinguishes between research and development phase. Al-
though the definitions are quite similar, they are treated
differently. During the research phase, the company is not
able to demonstrate an intangible asset that is expected to
create future economic benefits. Since recognition criteria
for an intangible asset pursuant to IAS 38.21 are not fulfilled
in the research phase, these costs must be charged as an
expense. This mainly includes obtaining knowledge, evalu-
ating research or selecting alternatives (IAS 38.54 - 56).
In the development phase, expenditures are obligated to
be recognized as an intangible asset if the basic definition
and recognition principles (IAS 38.8 – 28.23) in addition to
the following six criteria are satisfied:
1. Technical feasibility
2. Intention of completion for sale or use
3. Ability to use or sale
4. Proof of how to generate future economic benefits
5. Availability of sufficient resources (technical, financial
and other) to complete the development
6. Reliability in measuring attributable costs
Design, construction and testing of alternatives, pre-production
or pilot plants can be considered as appropriate examples
(IAS 38.57 - 60). According to IAS 38.71 restatement of past
expenses is prohibited. Additionally, IFRS forces compa-
nies to expense their R&D if they are not able to distinguish
between research and development phase (IAS 38.53).
If all criteria for recognition are fulfilled, R&D expendi-
tures that arose from that date on are capitalized at cost.
These expenditures include all directly attributable costs like
materials, employee benefits, fees etc. to bring the asset into
the intended shape (IAS 38.65 – 38.67). For subsequent mea-
surement, IAS 38.72 requires the use of the cost model unless
there is an active market. If the latter applies, companies get
the option to adopt the revaluation model.
In addition, the entity has to determine whether the use-
ful life of the asset capitalized is finite or infinite using the
criteria stated in IAS 38.90. While a finite useful life calls for
amortization, an infinite one requires the company to con-
duct an impairment test in line with IAS 36 on an annual
basis and if an indication for impairment arises (IAS 38.97;
IAS 38.108).
In terms of disclosure, the company has to differenti-
ate between internally generated and other intangible as-
sets. These categories need to include gross carrying amount
along with a reconciliation at the end and beginning of the
period, useful life (if any), amortization method and accu-
mulated amount including impairment, reasons supporting
various assessments and other special requirements stated in
IAS 38.118 – 38.128. Although IFRS capitalization policy dif-
fers from German standards as they only provide an option
for capitalization, the discrepancy is rather formal than sub-
stantial. The mentioned criteria obligating capitalization of
R&D are considered as quite subjective and therefore allow
a certain degree of flexibility. If managers intend to expense
some of their R&D instead of capitalizing, they can simply
justify the assessment. Therefore, R&D accounting might be
driven by earnings management incentives such as to smooth
income (Markarian et al., 2008).
2.2. The trade-off between relevance and objectivity
Hardly any topic shows as much different accounting
treatments among countries as R&D (Garanina et al., 2016).
The decision to allow or even force companies to capitalize
R&D expenditures is mainly a trade-off between relevance
and objectivity. Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB)
forces US companies to expense all their R&D costs. Capital-
ization is prohibited due to the fear of impaired objectivity.
FASB argues that expensing prevents managers from capital-
izing R&D projects that show low probability to create future
economic benefits. Additionally, expensing should avoid
managers to conduct earnings management when deciding
to capitalize R&D. (Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; Healy et al.,
2002; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996).
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) as well
as German legislature, focus on the value relevance aspect by
allowing capitalization. Thereby they respond to the arising
importance of R&D, arguing that it represents a high value
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Figure 1: R&D accounting according to IFRS (own figure based on IAS 38)
asset whose disregard would earnestly decrease credibility
and relevance of financial statements (Healy et al., 2002). It
is reasoned that R&D creates a positive impact on profitabil-
ity and market value and thus provides value relevant infor-
mation to shareholders and investors (Lev and Sougiannis,
1996; Sougiannis, 1994).
3. Earnings management through R&D
3.1. Definition and incentives
The most popular definition of earnings management is
given by Schipper (1989), indicating that it is “the purpose-
ful intervention in the external financial reporting process,
with the intent of obtaining some private gain”. Since finan-
cial reports should reflect managers’ perception of the firms’
performance, accounting standards have to allow for a cer-
tain range of judgment. However, mangers can also use this
flexibility to alter reports in a way that deceives stakeholders
about the true economic performance or influences contrac-
tual outcomes that are based on accounting numbers (Healy
and Wahlen, 1999). This issue exactly reflects the problem of
discretion in R&D accounting. On the one hand, standard set-
ters of the IASB want to enable a certain degree of judgment
since managers themselves are the best qualified to assess
whether a R&D project will create future economic benefits
and therefore should be recognized as an asset. On the other
hand, it is obvious that managers might tend to act oppor-
tunistically to improve outcomes and thus misuse the given
flexibility. However, it is important to distinguish earnings
management from fraud. In contrast to fraud, earnings man-
agement uses accounting judgements that are in line with le-
gal boundaries and generally accepted accounting principles
(Makar et al., 2000).
Earnings management through R&D capitalization rep-
resents a kind of accrual-based earnings management since
managers defer expenditures to subsequent periods when the
intangible asset will be amortized (if useful live is finite) or
impaired. Thus, managers can deal with accruals to improve
their results. The total amount spend on R&D is a way to
conduct real earnings management as the amount of R&D in-
vestments directly influences financial statements (Enomoto
et al., 2015).
Incentives to exercise earning management through R&D
comprise income smoothing, bonus plans and debt covenants
(Markarian et al., 2008). The latter proposes that managers
are more likely to choose income increasing accounting poli-
cies when their companies are high leveraged and closer
to violate debt covenants (Duke and Hunt III, 1990). The
bonus plan incentive suggests that managers tend to choose
accounting policies that improve their bonuses (Healy and
Wahlen, 1999). However, the focus of the thesis will be on
income smoothing caused by R&D capitalization, meaning
that managers apply earnings management to reduce income
fluctuations (Hepworth, 1953). This is justified by the lack of
sufficient data to analyze the bonus plan hypothesis and by
the restricted extent of the thesis to include the debt covenant
incentive. Additionally, income smoothing is the most exam-
ined hypothesis in the current literature regarding R&D ac-
counting discretion.
3.2. The income smoothing hypothesis
Income smoothing comprises all tools managers may use
in order to scale down fluctuations of disclosed income fig-
ures, with regard to some income targets, using artificial (ac-
counting) or real (transactional) variables (Koch, 1981; Leuz
et al., 2003). There are several accounting techniques to
C. Brettschneider / Junior Management Science 4(2) (2019) 151-172154
smooth income like gross revenue manipulation, overpro-
duction of finished goods, property accounting or intangi-
ble asset accounting, which also includes R&D (Hepworth,
1953). As this thesis focuses on accounting discretion, only
artificial variables are considered, looking at how managers
potentially use accruals in terms of R&D capitalization, to
reduce income variability. Concerning the income smooth-
ing hypothesis, income reflects the normal earnings power
of a company, which is reported as operating income or earn-
ings before interest and tax (EBIT) in the companies’ financial
statements (Koch, 1981). This is consistent with prior stud-
ies indicating operating profitability as the income smooth-
ing target (Barnea et al., 1976; Makar et al., 2000; Moses,
1987). Therefore, in the following, earnings and income are
used synonymously. However, a sensitivity analysis will be
conducted later in section 7.4. to examine if there are prob-
ably other income smoothing targets such as net income or
earnings per share (EPS) since it cannot be presumed that op-
erating profitability is the company’s only smoothing target
(Imhoff, 1981).
Motives for managers to smooth earnings over time
through R&D are multi-layered. One of the most important
aspects is the reduced risk through low income fluctuation.
The lower the observed volatility, the lower is the perceived
assessment of various claimants about the stability and po-
tential bankruptcy of the company. Thus, borrowing costs of
the enterprise decrease as debt capital providers are more
confident in getting back their money on time (Trueman and
Titman, 1988). Simultaneously, the selling price of shares
increases as (risk averse) investors tend to prefer companies
characterized by a low risk. Stable earnings are also desirable
form a shareholder’s perspective since they are better suited
to indicate higher dividend payment than variable earnings.
(Beidleman, 1973). Other stakeholders also feel more con-
fident with an income smoothing approach, as it reflects
security and stability, leading to higher overall satisfaction
(Hepworth, 1953).
Additionally, the company itself benefits from a smooth
income. Having huge fluctuation in earnings, it becomes
difficult to develop detailed plans and budgets for further
periods, as these are based on past performance. Further-
more, managers themselves are assessed by budgets estab-
lished (Beidleman, 1973). Since volatility in the firm’s in-
come could be a potential reason to displace managers, they
are interested in smooth income. Also income based compen-
sation might serve as an incentive for managers to conduct
income smoothing (Brayshaw and Eldin, 1989).
Smooth income further incorporates tax advantages. In
case of a progressive tax rate for example, companies would
show direct tax savings by smoothing their income, compared
to high volatility (Hepworth, 1953).
The underlying reason to engage in income smoothing
determines whether the managers’ aim is to convey private,
internal information to stakeholders like described by Beidle-
man (1973) or to reach some opportunistically driven targets
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003). It is important to consider
that income smoothing also faces some difficulties. Assessing
the right amount that has to be adjusted is often quite am-
bitious. It involves guesses and estimations that might lead
to over- or under adjustment and thus counter-smoothing.
(Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003).
4. Literature review
Starting in the mid-20th century, earnings management
has been developed as one of the main research areas in ac-
counting literature. First, the focus was primarily on detect-
ing and investigating earnings management followed by an
analysis of incentives, conditions and tools managers might
use to alter earnings. In 1953, Hepworth was one of the
first researchers who looked at possible motivations to en-
gage in income smoothing as a part of earnings management.
At that time, various research evolved, indicating that man-
ager use accounting discretion and choices to influence earn-
ings and thus proofed the existence of earnings management.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) detected that there is an un-
usual high amount of slightly positive earnings compared to
small negative ones, giving the evidence that companies en-
gage in earnings management to avoid reporting losses. The
income-smoothing hypothesis was confirmed i. a. by Bei-
dleman (1973) and Koch (1981), who indicated that income
smoothing is higher if costs for it are low and ownership is
diverse.
As R&D investments have become more and more im-
portant in the early 2000s, researchers were concerned with
the best R&D accounting policy that avoids discretion and
therefore earnings management. Various studies as those
performed by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) or Zhao (2002)
proofed that R&D capitalization is value relevant and should
therefore be the preferred accounting method. Cazavan-Jeny
and Jeanjean (2003) described R&D capitalization as a sig-
nal for stakeholders as it is positively related with stock re-
turns. This was supported by Oswald and Zarowin (2007)
who showed that the association between current year re-
turns and future earnings is higher in case of R&D capitaliza-
tion. However, Chan et al. (2007) claimed that higher R&D
intensity indicates company’s performance, independent of
the accounting method used. Wang et al. (2017) consid-
ered R&D accounting policy mainly as a trade-off between
accounting performance that is supported through expens-
ing and market value that is increased by capitalization.
Real earnings management was examined by Osma and
Young (2009), Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011) and Tahinakis
(2014), who concluded that companies cut their R&D invest-
ments to avoid reporting losses or to show positive earnings.
Additionally, Seybert (2010) proofed that managers tend to
overinvest in R&D in case of capitalization due to reputation
concerns.
Besides, managers might also use accrual-based earnings
management through R&D capitalization. However, research
on that topic is relatively young and result are inconsistent.
Zicke (2014) and Abrahams and Sidhu (1998) came to the
result that managers capitalize more of their R&D expendi-
tures to avoid reporting losses or earnings decrease. Further-
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more, Markarian et al. (2008) and Triki-Damak and Halioui
(2013) examined that managers use R&D capitalization to
smooth earnings over periods in a setting of French and Ital-
ian companies. This is only partly supported by Persson and
Fuentes (2011) who could merely indicate income smooth-
ing through R&D capitalization in one of three periods look-
ing at Swedish enterprises. This difference can be explained
by Garanina et al. (2016) who indicated that earnings man-
agement incentives to capitalize R&D vary across countries.
While income smoothing through R&D was detected in Ger-
many, Russia used R&D to meet debt covenants which was
also proofed in France by Triki-Damak and Halioui (2013).
However, the study conducted by Guidara et al. (2014) in
France suggested that managers do not use R&D account-
ing discretion to smooth earnings but rather support the real
earnings management literature.
5. Hypothesis development
As already stated in section 2.1., R&D accounting accord-
ing to IFRS allows for a certain degree of flexibility. The de
facto right for capitalization enables managers to easily de-
cide how to account for R&D based on the current economic
situation. If they prefer expensing instead of capitalization
or vice versa they can simply substantiate this approach by
arguing that they are not able to generate future economic
benefits or costs on a project cannot be measured reliable
for capitalization (Garanina et al., 2016; Makar et al., 2000;
Markarian et al., 2008).
The discretion in accounting for R&D given by IFRS can
be used by managers as an instrument to conduct income
smoothing in terms of accrual-based earnings management
as described in section 3. Auditors confirm that accruals
are among the most common methods to manage earnings.
As R&D capitalization choice is based on accruals by defer-
ring development expense to future periods through amorti-
zation/impairment, it is reasonable to argue that managers
use R&D accounting to engage in earnings management to
smooth income (Nelson et al., 2003; Persson and Fuentes,
2011). There are many studies indicating that managers do
smooth their income and have reasonable incentives (see 3.2.
and 4.) such as to reduce borrowing cost or increase share
prices (Beidleman, 1973; Trueman and Titman, 1988).
To moderate fluctuation in their income managers first
analyze their pre-managed operating profitability as this is
presumed to be the income smoothing target (Barnea et al.,
1976; Makar et al., 2000; Moses, 1987). If they realize that
the current pre-managed operating profitability is below the
previous years’ profitability measure, they opt for account-
ing methods that increase reported earnings and vice versa
(Markarian et al., 2008). As R&D accounting policy directly
influences the extend of earnings, managers can control prof-
itability by choosing to expense or capitalize development
costs (Persson and Fuentes, 2011).
Thus, it is expectable that managers prefer to capitalize
a higher magnitude of their R&D expenditures if their pre-
managed operating profitability before R&D capitalization is
below the profitability of previous years. In return, expens-
ing is observed when pre-managed operating profitability be-
fore R&D capitalization is above the past years’ profitability.
Before R&D capitalization means that the amount of devel-
opment costs recorded as an intangible asset is not consid-
ered in the pre-managed profitability, assuming that all costs
are expensed first. Capitalization is determined only after
comparing the pre-managed profitability to previous years
(Markarian et al., 2008). Hence, managers decide on the
amount of development costs capitalized based on the com-
pany’s profitability change with the aim to report a smooth
income over the periods (Persson and Fuentes, 2011). Since
profitability commonly defines the relation between a com-
pany’s profit and the size of the business, this analysis defines
the change in operating profitability as the current year’s pre-
managed EBIT minus the average of the last two years’ EBIT
normalized by the current year’s total assets before R&D cap-
italization (Markarian et al., 2008). This aspect will be ex-
plained in section 6.2.1.
Therefore, the hypothesis examined is formulated as fol-
lows:
H: There is a negative relationship between the
change in a firm’s operating profitability and
R&D capitalization.
6. Research methodology
6.1. Sample selection
Data for the subsequent empirical analysis is gathered
from German listed companies. Germany is regarded to be
a suitable object of research because it is known to be one
of the innovation leaders, showing the highest R&D invest-
ments in Europe in 2016 (Hernández et al., 2017).
At first, all German listed companies are assigned to their
respective sectors (sector and industry are considered inter-
changeably) based on Global Industry Classification Stan-
dard (GICS). Additionally, the category “conglomerate” is
added for companies engaging in various fields. Financials,
real estate, energy and consumer staples sectors are excluded
from the analysis since they do not show any or sufficient
R&D investments or do not publish them and are therefore
not appropriate to be considered.
Secondly, companies within an industry are ranked based
on their market capitalization. Within each industry annual
reports are analyzed from the greatest to the smallest com-
pany over a period of four years (2013 – 2016). Those who
do not show any R&D capitalization, do not disclose them
concretely or refuse to disaggregate capitalized development
cost from other intangible asset are removed from the list.
Still, it cannot be assumed that these companies do not en-
gage in earnings management through R&D (Persson and
Fuentes, 2011).
For the remaining companies, the largest of each sector
are incorporated to end up with a total sample size of 92.
Recapitulated, the analysis is based on an entire population
of 23 companies over a time range of four years. Annual
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reports of six years have to be analyzed for each company
since the estimation of changes over periods requires to go
back further in the past for the first year incorporated (see
6.2.1.).
For the empirical analysis, R&D numbers have to be
collected manually, looking at the annual reports of the com-
panies. R&D capitalization can either be disclosed directly
within the consolidated balance sheet, in the intangible asset
movement schedule or in the notes. Other numbers neces-
sary were partially gathered from the data platform WRDS.
For the remaining individual figures and ratios, formulas
were calculated with Excel. To conduct the empirical analy-
sis, SPSS is used as a statistical software.
Data selection reveals that the extend of R&D disclosure
is quite different. While the amount of qualitative informa-
tion is very extensive this is not always the case for quan-
titative reports. Sometimes it is difficult to determine the
exact amount capitalized during the year as companies hes-
itate to disclose a large scale of figures. However, this has
been improving over the years, showing that R&D has been
becoming more and more important for companies to com-
municate to their stakeholders. Approximately every fourth
euro expensed for R&D currently reappears as an asset in the
companies’ balance sheets but the amount capitalized differs
across industries (Leibfried & Pfanzelt, 2014).
Capitalization in the pharmaceutical industry is rather
rare although it is known to be R&D intensive. Due to
the high risks until the pharmaceutical product approval
is reached, companies are forced to expense R&D. The most
common reason refraining from capitalization is the lack of
probable future economic benefits.
6.2. Specification of variables
6.2.1. Dependent and independent variables
For each observation of the sample, a set of variables must
be defined and calculated in order to perform the empirical
analysis. First, RDCapitalization is introduced as the depen-
dent variable. It is calculated as the absolute gross amount
of development cost capitalized in each year divided by the
company’s total assets (Markarian et al., 2008; Persson and
Fuentes, 2011).
Amortization and impairment on intangible assets of the
respective year are not considered in the total amount capi-
talized (as some prior studies did) because they are not sub-
jected to any accounting choice and additionally could also
refer to previous years’ issues. Another approach would be to
include the amortized and impaired amount of the develop-
ment cost capitalized during the respective year, if there are
any, since they reappear in the income statement and thus
reduce earnings. This would lead to an opposite effect re-
ducing the income increasing consequence of R&D capital-
ization, but this information is not published in any annual
report. Additionally, these amounts would be very small and
therefore are not presumed to change the results significantly.
Consistent with preceding earnings management studies, to-
tal assets serve as a deflator (Jones, 1991). Another way to
scale R&D capitalization could be net income as it is directly
related to earnings. This approach could bias the results since
all years which show negative values would have to be re-
moved from the sample (Markarian et al., 2008).
To examine the established hypothesis above, ∆RoA
serves as the independent variable. It reflects the change
in return on assets (RoA) over the average of two years and
represents the operating profitability progress of the com-
pany. Thus,∆RoA is calculated by subtracting the average of
the last two years’ EBIT from the current year’s pre-managed
EBIT (without R&D capitalization) normalized by the cur-
rent year’s total assets before R&D capitalization (Markarian
et al., 2008).
∆RoAt =
(EBITt −R&D capitalizedt)− EBITt−1+EBITt−22
Total assetst −R&D capitalizedt (1)
Since R&D capitalized is deducted from current EBIT, it
is appropriate to equally adjust current assets by subtract-
ing the same amount. How to exactly account for ∆RoA
slightly differs in previous studies. It is not clearly defined
whether total assets are used with or without R&D capitaliza-
tion. (Garanina et al., 2016; Triki-Damak and Halioui, 2013;
Markarian et al., 2008; Persson and Fuentes, 2011). How-
ever, as the amount capitalized during a year is relativity low
compared to total assets, this should not lead to profound
changes in the results.
The average over the previous two fiscal years is used be-
cause it is assumed that managers as well as the market con-
sider the change in operating profitability as the change in
“base” earnings, rather than the change related to the latest
earnings reported (Markarian et al., 2008). This approach
has been examined by Markarian et al. (2008) who indicate
that R2 decreases when taking the change over one instead
of two periods. This aspect will also be examined in section
7.4.
Even though this thesis solely focuses on R&D capitaliza-
tion to smooth income, it could not be ruled out that man-
agers simultaneously use other accruals or operating deci-
sions to conduct earnings management. Thus, it could not
be assumed that pre-managed RoA is not influenced by other
instruments (Markarian et al., 2008; Persson and Fuentes,
2011).
6.2.2. Control variables
To decrease variance error and increase validity of the
empirical analysis, several control variables are added to
the model. The first one comprises the current year’s pre-
managed RoA, which is calculated as the company’s EBIT
before R&D capitalization divided by current total assets less
capitalized R&D. The present operating profitability serves
as a proxy for the expected future operating profitability
since this data is not available (Miller and Skinner, 1998).
Expected future operating profitability is presumed to be
an indicator for successful completion of R&D projects. A
high value increases the probability to obtain future eco-
nomic benefits (one of the six criteria stated in IAS 38 for
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Table 1: Sample by industries (own table)
Industry Number of companies Number of observations Percentage
Conglomerate 2 8 9%
Consumer discretionary 4 16 17%
Health care 4 16 17%
Industrials 4 16 17%
Information technology 2 8 9%
Materials 3 12 13%
Telecommunication services 2 8 9%
Utilities 2 8 9%
Total 23 92 100%
R&D capitalization). Further, current profitability might also
signal that the company commands sufficient resources to
finalize and use the R&D project, which also reflects one of
the six capitalization criteria according to IFRS. Therefore,
expected future profitability and R&D capitalization might
be positively related (Markarian et al., 2008). Though, the
argumentation also works the other way around considering
the earnings management approach. Profitable firms have
an incentive to expense large parts of their R&D in order to
decrease tax payments as well as political costs. Companies
characterized by low profitability tend to capitalize as much
of their R&D as possible to eke out achievements (Markar-
ian et al., 2008; Persson and Fuentes, 2011). Additionally,
Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2003) argue that highly prof-
itable companies prefer to expense their R&D as they do not
want to ruin the analysts’ image concerning their earnings
quality. This is also supported by Aboody and Lev (1998)
who examined that less profitable firms capitalize more of
their development costs than high profitable ones. Follow-
ing this argumentation, a negative relationship should be
observed between RDCapitalization and RoA. Hence, from
a methodological point of view, the association cannot be
clearly determined in advance.
RDTotal represents the second control variable. It com-
prises the total amount of R&D investments spent by the com-
pany within one year divided by total assets in the current
fiscal year before R&D capitalization. It could be assumed
that more R&D projects fulfill IAS 38’s recognition criteria
if the companies’ R&D investments are higher. Thus, man-
agers capitalize more in case of higher R&D spending, indi-
cating a positive relation between RDTotal and RDCapital-
ization. Nevertheless, IAS 38 incorporates a certain degree
of subjectivity, meaning that managers can decide on how
much to capitalize by arguing appropriately. In addition, it
has to be considered that there is a variety of other aspects
and circumstances that determine managers’ R&D account-
ing policy such as conservative accounting behavior (Garan-
ina et al., 2016; Markarian et al., 2008). Besides, there are
arguments indicating a negative association between RDTo-
tal and RDCapitalization. R&D intensive enterprises used
to carry out more R&D projects than companies spending
less on R&D. Hence, it is more complex and elaborate for
them to review whether recognition criteria are fulfilled for
each single project. Since this is perceived to be very time
consuming, managers might simply expense R&D (Garanina
et al., 2016; Markarian et al., 2008). It could also be argued
that companies which spend less on R&D in a period (maybe
because they are facing bad times) rather continue to work
on existing projects. Thus, the probability of those projects
to fulfill recognition criteria increases. In consequence, it is
not possible to make ex ante predictions concerning the rela-
tion of RDTotal and RDCapitalization (Garanina et al., 2016;
Markarian et al., 2008).
Given that high leveraged companies are presumed to
have an incentive to capitalize more of their R&D costs to
improve their result, (financial) Leverage is introduced as
third control variable. It is computed as the fraction of total
debt from total assets before R&D capitalization (Markarian
et al., 2008). Managers that avoid violating debt covenants
through R&D capitalization increase their probability to get
attractive loans and reduce (perceived) risk of the business.
Therefore, a positive relationship between Leverage and RD-
Capitalization is expected (Aboody and Lev, 1998; Cazavan-
Jeny and Jeanjean, 2003; Hamada, 1972).
(Firm) Size is defined as the natural logarithm of current
year’s total assets before R&D capitalization effects (Markar-
ian et al., 2008). Due to nature of research this variable is
implemented to control for the companies’ political sensitiv-
ity and market/political visibility as these aspects seem to in-
fluence accounting decisions of managers and thus R&D cap-
italization (Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986; Markarian et al.,
2008). Since larger companies tend to be more sensitive
to political cost pressure, they are exposed to higher capi-
tal transfers. Therefore, governments focus more on huge
firms as their ability to contribute to state income is higher.
Companies want to avoid this pressure by reducing reported
earnings. In terms of R&D, managers will prefer expensing as
it decreases the company’s income (Aboody and Lev, 1998;
Dufour and Zemzem, 2005; Triki-Damak and Halioui, 2013;
Othman and Zéghal, 2006). But not only the government
pays particular attention to large companies. As the com-
pany size increases, managers face more and stronger exam-
ination by several analysts. The growing visibility rather pre-
vents managers from excessively influencing reported earn-
C. Brettschneider / Junior Management Science 4(2) (2019) 151-172158
ings (Garanina et al., 2016; Othman and Zéghal, 2006). An-
other aspect why to consider size effects has been indicated
by Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2003). They propose that
large enterprises primarily invest in basic research, mainte-
nance and product upgrades. Major parts of these costs typi-
cally do not fulfill recognition criteria of IAS 38 and therefore
must be expensed. These suggestions anticipate a negative
relationship between Size and RDCapitalization.
High-Capitalizer as the fourth control variable is calcu-
lated as a dummy variable equal to one if the capitalized
R&D amount normalized by earnings is above the median
of the sample firms and zero if it is below the median. High-
Capitalizer is introduced to control for a potential, significant
impact of R&D capitalization on earnings (Markarian et al.,
2008).
LagCapitalization as the fifth variable refers to capital-
ized R&D during the previous year, since lagged variables are
considered as a strategy to control for endogeneity (Boone
et al., 2007). The decision not to take LagCapitalization into
account excludes a seriously correlated variable (Markar-
ian et al., 2008). Further, the variable implies how consis-
tent companies perform their R&D accounting policy (Zicke,
2014). However, it is quite difficult to determine a company’s
consistency if managers conduct earnings management. Ad-
ditionally, it has to be kept in mind that R&D investments are
basically difficult to predict and outcomes of R&D spending
could fluctuate over the years (Garanina et al., 2016). Even
though there might be concerns due to serial correlation
between LagCapitalization and RDCapitalization, Markar-
ian et al. (2008) proofed that worries are unfounded using
Durbin Watson statistic and calculating a first order autocor-
relation.
To control for future growth opportunities, (stock mar-
ket) performance and risk of a company, GrowthExpectation
is introduced as sixth variable. It represents the market-to-
book ratio dividing market capitalization of a company by
its book value of equity. (Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2003;
Fama and French, 1992; Markarian et al., 2008; Persson and
Fuentes, 2011). It is expected that companies characterized
by a high market-to-book ratio indicate a higher R&D inten-
sity than companies having a low market value compared
to their book value of equity (Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean,
2003). Additionally, it might be that companies which prefer
to invest in growth opportunities (such as R&D) rather than
in assets already in place show a higher market-to-book ra-
tio since investors include those investments in their present
value calculation leading to a higher share price. Due to these
high investments company’s debt might increase. This causes
lenders to include higher (investment and financing) restric-
tions in their lending contracts limiting the firm’s funding
policy. These restrictions could refer to underinvestment is-
sues or general accounting-based debt covenants. Obviously,
managers want to avert the constraints using accounting dis-
cretion and thus tend to capitalize R&D to improve results
and avoid showing underinvestment in their balance sheets.
Thus, a positive relation between GrowthExpectation and
RDCapitalization is hypothesized (Triki-Damak and Halioui,
2013; Myers, 1976; Shabou and Taktak, 2002).
Growth is introduced as seventh control variable, cal-
culated as the percentage change in sales over one period.
Growth is included as it is presumed that high growing com-
panies engage in more R&D projects and thus invest more in
R&D than companies with small growth rates (Cazavan-Jeny
and Jeanjean, 2003; Persson and Fuentes, 2011).
The analysis additionally controls for years and industry
effects by adding dummy variables to the regression. For
each year and each industry, dummy variables are calculated
while one of each category is excluded in the regression since
there must be a reference category in case of categorial vari-
ables. For a detailed overview of the variables considered,
including definition and formula, please refer to Appendix 1.
7. Data analysis and empirical results
7.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistic on selected vari-
ables for the empirical analysis. Mean of RDCapitalization
indicates that sample firms capitalize on average 1.61 % of
their total assets. At the final ninetieth percentile, capital-
ization measures 5.24 % of total assets. Companies basically
spend 6.03 % of their assets (assets are considered as before
R&D capitalization as described in 6.2) on R&D. The most
R&D intensive firms (last decile) even invest 15.97 % of their
assets in R&D, while less R&D focused firms do not reach at
least 1 %. Examining the relationship between RDCapitaliza-
tion and RDTotal shows that companies capitalize on average
26.5 % of their R&D expenditures. The mean level of indebt-
edness reaches 65.69 %, indicating that selected companies
are largely financed by debt rather than equity. The average
(pre-managed) RoA shows that companies are profitable at
5.3 %, while the change in RoA clarifies that profitability of
the sample firms decreases compared to the previous two fis-
cal years with a mean of -1.26 %. However, the first decile
shows a positive RoA development at 2.21 %. The average
market-to-book ratio is around 3.09 indicating that market
capitalization of the analyzed companies is more than three
times higher than their book value of equity. Thus, sharehold-
ers perceive these companies to be highly profitable. Even the
lowest 10 % nearly show a ratio of one. Companies’ growth
in revenue reaches on average 6.85 % with a first decile of
23.07 %, indicating mostly positive growth rates. In the anal-
ysis Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets,
indicates a mean of 9.37. Assets of the sample firms are on
average 59 billion euros.
As the analysis is conducted across industries, it is ap-
propriate to additionally perform a descriptive statistic by in-
dustry, presented in Table 3. Information technology and
telecommunication services sectors show the highest R&D
capitalization rates with 7.22 % and 4.10 % of their assets.
These companies also record the highest R&D investments
per assets indicating an average of 21.96 % and 11.57 %. The
remaining industries vary between 5.81 % and 2.15 %. Com-
panies of the materials sector and conglomerates reveal the
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on selected variables (own table)
Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Percentiles
10 90
RDCapitalization 0.016055 0.030586 0.000131 0.138229 0.000511 0.052395
RDTotal 0.060349 0.093376 0.001134 0.752232 0.003046 0.159667
Leverage 0.656868 0.154544 0.185897 0.929359 0.483224 0.844783
ROA 0.052995 0.046261 -0.063809 0.153846 -0.018890 0.110108
∆RoA -0.012644 0.042872 -0.173077 0.046064 -0.069908 0.022120
GrowthExpectation 3.086864 3.281002 0.413424 27.923232 0.921325 5.049868
Growth 0.068518 0.111889 -0.244769 0.401038 -0.056788 0.223071
Size 9.366865 2.330831 3.802208 12.909126 5.644880 12.039085
Assets (EUR millions) 59,010.97 88,264.17 51.90 409,732.00 306.88 171,077.20
lowest R&D capitalization rate with 0.07 % and 0.2 %. The
most leveraged companies are those from the utilities and
conglomerate sector with a debt to asset (before R&D) ratio
of 78.89 % and 81.70 %. Companies in the health care sector
are the least leveraged firms with debt of 54.72 % of their as-
sets. All industries indicate an average positive profitability
ratio before R&D capitalization, with the health care and ma-
terials sectors performing best at a pre-managed RoA of 8.6
%. Telecommunication services only reaches 0.32 % having
the lowest profitability ratio before R&D capitalization. All
industries, except health care, indicate a decreasing change
in RoA compared to their previous two fiscal years with infor-
mation technology companies having the lowest value (-8.2
%). This is consistent with the fact that these firms simulta-
neously show the highest R&D capitalization rate per assets.
Their pre-managed RoA is relatively low compared to the op-
erating profitability of previous years where R&D has already
been capitalized. This leads to a highly negative change in
RoA. Thus, these firms’ performance largely depends on R&D
capitalization.
7.2. Correlation analysis
In addition to the descriptive statistic, a correlation anal-
ysis (Table 4) is conducted to examine the (linear) relation-
ships between the selected variables. As they are all scaled
metrically, it is appropriate to perform a Bravais-Pearson cor-
relation. It should be considered that Bravais-Pearson cor-
relation analyzes associations at a univariate level. It does
not incorporate cross-correlations between independent and
control variables, which can change the results significantly.
Additionally, the direction of the relationship cannot be de-
termined. This calls for caution in interpreting the results.
Furthermore, significant correlation does not necessarily in-
dicate causality between variables (Markarian et al., 2008;
Persson and Fuentes, 2011).
At first, the outcome statistically supports the hypothesis
developed above since ∆RoA and RDCapitalization show a
strong and significant negative relationship. The same ap-
plies to pre-managed RoA being highly significant below the
0.01 level. This is visualized in Figure 2 showing a biaxial
scatter diagram that plots the relationship between RoA and
RDCapitalization as well as ∆RoA and RDCapitalization.
Leverage and RDCapitalization show a positive correla-
tion, supporting the assumption that managers also use R&D
capitalization to avoid debt covenants violations. However,
this relation is not significant. The strong positive relation-
ship between RDTotal and RDCapitalization with high signif-
icance indicates that companies which invest more in R&D
also tend to capitalize more as they have more resources
available to finalize their projects (Figure 3).
It is interesting to observe that RDTotal and pre-managed
RoA are significantly negatively correlated. This leads to the
assumption that less profitable firms invest more in R&D than
profitable ones. This might be due to the hope to increase
their RoA when spending more on R&D. This guess stresses
the importance of R&D investments from a firm’s perspective.
The same can be observed for the relation between∆RoA and
RDTotal. The analysis also uncovers that small companies
spend relatively more on R&D and tend to capitalize more
than big companies since there is a negative significant rela-
tion between Size and RDTotal as well as Size and RDCapi-
talization. Finally, it could be observed that Growth and RD-
Capitalization are positively correlated. This demonstrates
that companies being able to increase their sales compared
to the previous year capitalize more of their R&D. This is in
line with the correlation of RoA / ∆RoA and RDCapitaliza-
tion, since, ceteris paribus, a higher amount of revenue leads
to a higher RoA. To decrease earnings in the current year,
firms capitalize less to get closer to the prior years’ earnings
and thus smooth income.
Correlation by industry points out that the industries
characterized by the highest capitalization rates, informa-
tion technology and telecommunication services, also reveal
the strongest, highly significant correlations between ∆RoA
and RDCapitalization. Simultaneously industries with low
capitalization rates indicate low and insignificant relations
between these two variables. The strongest relation between
RDTotal and RDCapitalization can be found in telecommu-
nication services and utilities industry with a correlation
coefficient above 0.9. For further details on industry level
a detailed Bravais-Pearson correlation among selected vari-
ables can be found in Appendix 2.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on selected variables by industry (own table)
Industry Mean Std. Devia-
tion
Minimum Maximum
Industrials
RDCapitalization 0.009157 0.004916 0.003341 0.019698
RDTotal 0.029791 0.014085 0.010810 0.051334
Leverage 0.653007 0.104438 0.493048 0.780309
ROA 0.066361 0.025685 0.033399 0.126325
∆RoA -0.002101 0.016233 -0.024824 0.043442
Health care
RDCapitalization 0.010442 0.016033 0.000278 0.059322
RDTotal 0.058173 0.053209 0.009190 0.162162
Leverage 0.547237 0.191795 0.185897 0.735515
ROA 0.086307 0.032081 0.027156 0.153846
∆RoA 0.000621 0.022612 -0.060360 0.020377
Consumer discretionary
RDCapitalization 0.008643 0.004427 0.001499 0.014034
RDTotal 0.043423 0.019482 0.027697 0.080884
Leverage 0.725234 0.064679 0.594415 0.784248
ROA 0.052659 0.042292 -0.024117 0.123249
∆RoA -0.004819 0.017374 -0.056443 0.022371
Telecommunication services
RDCapitalization 0.040983 0.043028 0.000704 0.083992
RDTotal 0.115746 0.122290 0.001134 0.238525
Leverage 0.618622 0.125519 0.488592 0.739036
ROA 0.003151 0.053632 -0.062815 0.060898
∆RoA -0.037811 0.056588 -0.113842 0.021535
Conglomerate
RDCapitalization 0.002017 0.000889 0.000567 0.002975
RDTotal 0.037886 0.028177 0.010108 0.098334
Leverage 0.817013 0.109941 0.701608 0.929359
ROA 0.035130 0.025970 -0.020665 0.061358
∆RoA -0.005757 0.031667 -0.074000 0.026908
Utilities
RDCapitalization 0.011815 0.011909 0.001389 0.030133
RDTotal 0.021508 0.019598 0.002959 0.044223
Leverage 0.788916 0.094291 0.693869 0.896771
ROA 0.018339 0.039073 -0.055501 0.066681
∆RoA -0.000237 0.046842 -0.081836 0.046064
Materials
RDCapitalization 0.000760 0.000926 0.000131 0.003303
RDTotal 0.024361 0.019280 0.001566 0.060960
Leverage 0.568811 0.051969 0.480923 0.642905
ROA 0.086136 0.022301 0.031566 0.125187
∆RoA -0.004677 0.024695 -0.045414 0.039978
Information technology
RDCapitalization 0.072192 0.065243 0.008637 0.138229
RDTotal 0.219554 0.222554 0.094549 0.752232
Leverage 0.625258 0.234131 0.359281 0.917293
ROA 0.012970 0.057223 -0.063809 0.073979
∆RoA -0.081982 0.082921 -0.173077 0.013906
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Figure 2: Scatter diagram between RoA, ∆RoA and RDCapitalization (own figure)
Figure 3: Scatter diagram between RDTotal and RDCapitalization (own figure)
7.3. Regression model
To test the hypothesis established, the statistical equation
for the multiple linear regression has the following general
form. The subscripted t represents different time periods,
while i typifies each sample firm included in the analysis.
RDCapitalizationi t = b0i t + b1i t∆ROAi t + b3i tLeveragei t
+ b4i tRDTotali t + b5i tLagCapitalizationi t
+ b6i tHighCapitalizeri t + b7i tSizei t + b8i tGrowthi t
+ b9i tGrowthiExpectationt + b10i tYearDummiesi t
+ b11i t IndustryDummiesi t + ui t
(2)
According to the hypothesis developed in section 5, it is
expected to observe a negative coefficient for b1it. Table 5
presents the regression results.
Model 1 shows that∆RoA is significantly negative as pre-
dicted in hypothesis H. This indicates that companies tend
to capitalize more if their current pre-managed profitability
is lower than the average of the previous two fiscal years.
Through R&D capitalization, managers avoid showing huge
amounts of R&D investments on the income statement and
thus improve their results and decrease the gap to prior years’
earnings. In case of a higher profitability in the present year
compared to the past, mangers prefer to expense R&D since
this helps them to lower their profitability and get closer to
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Table 5: Model 1 - Multiple linear regression testing hypothesis H (own table);
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level; R = 0.956 / R Square = 0.914 / Adjusted R
Square = 0.891 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0101
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.053 0.014 3.725 0.000 0.024 0.081
∆RoA -0.158* 0.065 -0.222 -2.426 0.018 -0.288 -0.028
ROA -0.119* 0.059 -0.179 -1.998 0.049 -0.237 0.000
Leverage 0.024* 0.011 0.123 2.161 0.034 0.002 0.047
RDTotal 0.075** 0.021 0.228 3.561 0.001 0.033 0.116
LagCapizalization 0.058* 0.023 0.107 2.491 0.015 0.012 0.105
HighCapitalizer -0.002 0.003 -0.027 -0.468 0.641 -0.008 0.005
Size -0.006** 0.001 -0.470 -5.742 0.000 -0.008 -0.004
Growth 0.016 0.014 0.058 1.121 0.266 -0.012 0.044
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.341 0.734 -0.001 0.001
the reported earnings of previous years. This result clearly
proofs the assumption (developed in section five) that man-
agers engage in accrual-based earnings management through
R&D accounting discretion to smooth their income. The find-
ings are consistent with prior studies conducted by Markar-
ian et al. (2008), Triki-Damak and Halioui (2013) and Abra-
hams and Sidhu (1998) who also demonstrated that man-
agers smooth income by exercising R&D accounting discre-
tion. Garanina et al. (2016) also support the results in some
parts as they find significant influence of ∆ROA on RDCap-
italization in Germany but not in Russia. Additionally, Pers-
son and Fuentes (2011) confirm the outcomes at least in one
of three periods observed. However, the study conducted by
Guidara et al. (2014) was not able to proof that R&D account-
ing choice is a management tool to smooth income.
Moreover, Model 1 shows that RoA is negatively signifi-
cant at a 0.05 level. This suggests that profitable firms (those
with a high pre-managed RoA) capitalize less than companies
with a lower profitability. The finding indirectly confirms the
hypothesis H since it reveals that less profitable firms cap-
italize more of their R&D to compensate bad performance
while highly profitable firms prefer expensing to offset results
above average, i. a. to decrease political cost and fluctuation
in their earnings (Aboody and Lev, 1998; Markarian et al.,
2008; Persson and Fuentes, 2011). It also supports the as-
sumption of Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2003) who argue
that high profitable companies prefer to expense their R&D
as they do not want to ruin the analysts’ image concerning
their earnings quality. The assumption that high profitability
signals sufficient resources to finalize the R&D project and
increases the probability to obtain future economic benefits
has to be rejected (Markarian et al., 2008).
Leverage shows a positive and significant coefficient, indi-
cating that the debt-covenant hypothesis can be confirmed as
well. According to the results, managers do also use R&D ac-
counting to avoid violating debt covenants (Aboody and Lev,
1998; Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2003; Hamada, 1972).
This is in line with studies conducted by Triki-Damak and
Halioui (2013). However, Markarian et al. (2008) have not
found a significant association between Leverage and RD-
Capitalization. Garanina et al. (2016) could only support
the debt covenant hypothesis for Russian but not for German
companies.
Furthermore, RDTotal is significantly and positively re-
lated to RDCapitalization indicating that firms that invest
more in R&D also capitalize larger parts of their R&D
projects. Thus, it could be argued that the probability of
R&D projects to fulfill the recognition criteria of IAS 38 in-
creases if companies spend more on R&D. Nevertheless, it
has to be taken into account that IAS 38 is subjected to ac-
counting discretion (Garanina et al., 2016; Markarian et al.,
2008). The results additionally show that companies do not
tend to expense R&D due to the complexity to determine
whether recognition criteria are met in case of higher R&D
investments (Garanina et al., 2016; Markarian et al., 2008).
Further, it is not confirmed that companies which spend less
on R&D rather promote existing projects that increase the
probability to fulfill recognition criteria.
As LagCapitalization reveals a positive coefficient, man-
agers capitalize more in the current year if they did so in the
previous period. It points out that companies attach impor-
tance to consistency and uniformity in their reporting behav-
ior despite of underlying earnings management incentives
(Markarian et al., 2008; Zicke, 2014).
HighCapitalizer is not significant, showing that the im-
pact of capitalization on earnings does not determine R&D
capitalization behavior (Markarian et al., 2008).
Model 1 proofs that Size is negatively (significant) associ-
ated with RDCapitalization as well. This is in line with the as-
sumption that large enterprises face higher market/political
visibility, leading to stronger and more detailed examinations
by several analysts. Thus, these companies cannot afford
to heavily engage in earnings management (Garanina et al.,
2016; Othman and Zéghal, 2006). Conversely, small compa-
nies that face less public attention can capitalize more and
thus improve their results more easily. It further suggests
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that huge companies mainly invest in basic research, mainte-
nance and product upgrades that typically do not meet recog-
nition criteria of IAS 38 (Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean, 2003;
Persson and Fuentes, 2011). Another interpretation leads
to the assumption that big enterprises expense larger parts
of their R&D in order to avoid high political costs (Dufour
and Zemzem, 2005). It is also possible that large companies
undertake riskier projects than small firm do as managers’
compensations are often based on stock options that corre-
late positively with the risk of underlying assets (Daves et al.,
2000; Garanina et al., 2016).
Growth shows a positive but insignificant coefficient.
Thus, it could not be assumed that growing companies that
usually invest a lot in R&D tend to capitalize more due to
increasing R&D resources available. (Cazavan-Jeny and
Jeanjean, 2003; Persson and Fuentes, 2011).
Finally, GrowthExpectation is not significant as well. This
shows that companies characterized by a high market-to-
book ratio do not capitalize more, indicating that the stock
market does not have an impact on capitalization behavior in
this model. A detailed comparison of how the results of this
study behave to prior literature can be found in Appendix 3.
To determine the quality of the regression model, ad-
justed R2 must be considered as the normal R2 automatically
grows with increasing number of independent variables and
therefore provides little informative value. Adjusted R2 indi-
cates that 89.1 % of variance in RDCapitalization is explained
by independent variables. Thus, the model appears to be a
good estimation. The ANOVA table (Appendix 4) addition-
ally shows that the regression creates significant results and
can therefore be used as a valid model.
To examine whether some variables must be excluded due
to collinearity, tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF)
are calculated. Table 6 points out that the regression does not
face collinearity problems since tolerance exceeds the thresh-
old of 0.1 and VIF is below 10 for all variables.
7.4. Sensitivity tests
In the following section it will be examined whether
changes in the regression model lead to fundamental changes
in the results to determine the robustness of the analysis. Ta-
ble 7 provides an overview of the tests that will be performed.
First, Model 2 is calculated replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoA2.
In Model 1 it is assumed that managers as well as the market
consider the change in operating profitability as the change in
“base” earnings (Markarian et al., 2008). That is why ∆RoA
refers to the average of the previous two fiscal years. Never-
theless, it could also be expected that managers’ smoothing
target refers to the change related to the latest earnings re-
ported. Therefore,∆RoA2 is introduced as the change in op-
erating profitability over one period (Markarian et al., 2008).
The results in table 8 show that ∆RoA2 is negative like
in Model 1 but insignificant. Thus, the hypothesis H would
be rejected in case of ∆RoA2. Additionally, adjusted R2 de-
creases, indicating that the explanatory power in Model 1
is slightly higher. The outcomes suggest that the managers’
smoothing target refers to the change in “base” profits rather
than to the change compared the previous year.
In Model 3 the dummy variable Manage is introduced to
check for earnings thresholds. It equals to one if R&D cap-
italization helps managers to convert a negative change in
operating profitability to a positive one. This might be rel-
evant because managers who face difficulties to reach pos-
itive ∆RoA could have an incentive to expense their R&D
even though it is below the established targets, as achiev-
ing a positive ∆RoA is impossible either way. Thus, Manage
assesses whether R&D capitalization is influenced by the fact
that the target of prior years’ profitability is unattainable. It
can be determined whether R&D capitalization is only driven
by thresholds and benchmark beating or is also used for in-
come smoothing purposes. Therefore Manage is expected to
show a positive coefficient (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997;
Markarian et al., 2008; Zicke, 2014).
The results show that Manage is positively significant at
a 0.01 level in both cases, indicating that the ability to off-
set a negative change in operating profitability through R&D
capitalization has to be considered in managers’ R&D capital-
ization behavior. Furthermore, ∆RoA as well as ∆RoA2 are
significant showing a negative coefficient. This proofs that
the income smoothing hypothesis is still confirmed even if
benchmark-beating ability is taken into account. Adjusted R2
increases in both models by 1.8 % / 1 % showing that the ex-
planatory power increases if Manage is added to the model.
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the additional control
variable when examining R&D capitalization behavior. These
findings are consistent with the study conducted by Markar-
ian et al. (2008). In this model, income smoothing based
on prior year’s numbers turns out to be considerable which
is previously rejected in Model 2. Even though explanatory
power is higher in case of ∆RoA, it could be suggested that
managers focus on base profits as well as on profits of the
prior year. As both income smoothing references seem to be
decisive, this will also be considered in the following analysis.
Although most of the literature determines operating
profitability as the income smoothing target as stated in sec-
tion 3.2., there is still some disagreement about the primary
smoothing target of a company. Therefore, a sensitivity anal-
ysis is used to evaluate whether managers might also use
R&D capitalization in terms of other smoothing targets than
operating profitability (Barnea et al., 1976; Makar et al.,
2000; Markarian et al., 2008; Michelson et al., 1995; Moses,
1987). Basically, the decisive criterion to determine the vari-
able to be smoothed is the management’s assumption about
how different stakeholders assess the smoothness of income.
Obviously, this is not always clearly determined, leading to
discussions and different perceptions about the smoothing
object. This makes it difficult for researchers to operational-
ize the very general manner of the income smoothing hy-
pothesis. Additionally, each company can pursue another
smoothing target, which is of course not easy to identify
(Imhoff, 1981; Ronen and Sadan, 1981). It might also be
that managers act opportunistically and choose the smooth-
ing target that maximizes their personal welfare. Based on
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Table 6: Collinearity statistics (own table)
Tolerance VIF
∆RoA 0.143 6.974
RoA 0.149 6.727
Leverage 0.372 2.691
RDTotal 0.293 3.410
LagCapizalization 0.651 1.537
HighCapitalizer 0.372 2.689
Size 0.179 5.601
Growth 0.444 2.251
GrowthExpectation 0.543 1.840
Table 7: Overview of the sensitivity tests performed (own table);
* Each model also tests the one year change and includes Manage as an additional variable. These variations can be found in the appendix.
Models Sensitivity test
Model 2 Replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoA2 Considering a one year change in RoA instead of a two
year change
Model 3 Introducing control variable Manage to
Model 1 and 2
Considering benchmark-beating ability
Model 4* Replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoE Considering the change in net income normalized by
total equity as the income smoothing target
Model 5* Replacing ∆RoA by ∆NetIncome/Assets Considering the change in net income normalized by
total assets as the income smoothing target
Model 6* Replacing ∆RoA by ∆EPS Considering the change in earnings per share as the in-
come smoothing target
Table 8: Model 2 - Replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoA2 (own table);
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level; R = 0.954 / R Square = 0.911 / Adjusted R
Square = 0.887 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0103
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.059 0.014 4.306 0.000 0.032 0.087
∆RoA2 -0.101 0.056 -0.140 -1.814 0.074 -0.211 0.010
ROA -0.164** 0.053 -0.247 -3.092 0.003 -0.269 -0.058
Leverage 0.022* 0.011 0.113 1.964 0.053 0.000 0.045
RDTotal 0.084** 0.020 0.256 4.111 0.000 0.043 0.125
LagCapizalization 0.061** 0.024 0.111 2.513 0.014 0.013 0.109
HighCapitalizer -0.003 0.003 -0.045 -0.799 0.427 -0.010 0.004
Size -0.006** 0.001 -0.479 -5.663 0.000 -0.008 -0.004
Growth 0.011 0.014 0.038 0.750 0.456 -0.017 0.038
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.263 0.793 -0.001 0.001
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Table 9: Model 3 - Introducing control variable Manage (own table);
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level; First table: R = 0.964 / R Square = 0.929 /
Adjusted R Square = 0.909 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0092; Second table: R = 0.959/ R Square = 0.920 / Adjusted R Square = 0.897 / Std. Error of
the Estimate = 0.0098
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.054 0.013 4.200 0.000 0.028 0.080
∆RoA -0.143* 0.060 -0.201 -2.400 0.019 -0.262 -0.024
ROA -0.098 0.054 -0.148 -1.800 0.076 -0.207 0.011
Manage 0.012** 0.003 0.165 3.919 0.000 0.006 0.018
Leverage 0.023* 0.010 0.117 2.252 0.027 0.003 0.044
RDTotal 0.077** 0.019 0.235 4.030 0.000 0.039 0.115
LagCapitalization 0.053* 0.021 0.096 2.454 0.017 0.010 0.095
HighCapitalizer -0.005 0.003 -0.088 -1.622 0.109 -0.012 0.001
Size -0.006** 0.001 -0.483 -6.450 0.000 -0.008 -0.004
Growth 0.011 0.013 0.039 0.810 0.421 -0.015 0.037
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.625 0.534 -0.001 0.001
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.053 0.013 3.980 0.000 0.026 0.079
∆RoA2 -0.125* 0.054 -0.174 -2.331 0.023 -0.232 -0.018
RoA -0.131** 0.052 -0.198 -2.527 0.014 -0.234 -0.028
Manage2 0.009** 0.003 0.120 2.842 0.006 0.003 0.015
Leverage 0.024* 0.011 0.122 2.221 0.030 0.002 0.046
RDTotal 0.073** 0.020 0.224 3.690 0.000 0.034 0.113
LagCapitalization 0.056* 0.023 0.102 2.412 0.018 0.010 0.102
HighCapitalizer -0.003 0.003 -0.057 -1.049 0.298 -0.010 0.003
Size -0.006** 0.001 -0.462 -5.715 0.000 -0.008 -0.004
Growth 0.006 0.013 0.020 0.408 0.684 -0.021 0.032
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.609 0.544 -0.001 0.001
that assumption, managers who are compensated dependent
on net income are less interested in smoothing net income
than managers getting compensated by the market value of
the company. It has to be considered that all these factors
again depend on how much influence these managers have
on income smoothing (Imhoff, 1981). As it becomes clear
that the income smoothing target is not easy to determine,
the sensitivity analysis tests different smoothing objectives
to examine which variable is most likely to be smoothed
without specifying that this is the only target used across
all firms. This extends prior literature on income smoothing
through R&D accounting since it solely focused on operating
profitability.
Model 4 replaces ∆RoA by ∆RoE (Return on equity),
which is calculated as the difference between current pre-
managed net income before R&D capitalization and the av-
erage net income the previous two fiscal years normalized by
current year’s equity.
∆RoEt =
(NetIncomet −R&D capitalizedt)− NetIncomet−1+NetIncomet−22
Equityt
(3)
Net income is chosen because prior research on income
smoothing suggests that managers who are concerned with
long term performance might prefer net income as the ap-
propriate target (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). It must be con-
sidered that tax effects are neglected in this model since pre-
managed net income is only calculated by subtracting R&D
capitalization from bottom line profit without taking the tax
effects incorporated into account (R&D reduces earnings be-
fore tax and thus tax payments). Table 10 shows the results
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after replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoE.
The regression reveals that∆RoE is also highly negatively
significant and thus an essential factor that has to be con-
sidered when analyzing R&D capitalization behavior. The
model indicates that managers also focus on income smooth-
ing in terms of bottom line profit. In consequence, operating
profitability cannot be assumed to be the only smoothing tar-
get of a company. Adjusted R2 decreases by nearly two per-
centage points compared to Model 1 indicating that ∆RoA
is somewhat more important than ∆RoE in terms of income
smoothing. RoE, Leverage, RDTotal, LagCapitalization and
Size remain significant with the same coefficient signs as in
Model 1. Adding Manage (related to ∆RoE) to the Model
as performed in Model 3, shows that adjusted R2 increases
with Manage being positively significant (Appendix 5). This
is consistent with findings in the previous model. In conclu-
sion, there are no fundamental changes if ∆RoA is replaced
by ∆RoE.
In a second step, ∆RoE is substituted by ∆RoE2 which
measures the change in RoE over one period to face the issue
discussed in Model 2. ∆RoE2 also shows a significant neg-
ative coefficient indicating that managers are not only con-
cerned with base RoE but also with the change to the pre-
vious year. Adjusted R2 increases marginally, showing that
∆RoE2 explains R&D capitalization variability slightly bet-
ter than ∆RoE. As in the previous models, including Manage
(related to ∆RoE2) increases explanatory power once more
by nearly 1 %. The respective regressions can be found in
Appendix 6.
Model 5 uses nearly the same variable definition as Model
4. The only difference is that the change in net income is
normalized by total assets before R&D capitalization.
∆NetIncome/Assetst =
(NetIncomet −R&D capitalizedt)− NetIncomet−1+NetIncomet−22
EquityTotal assetst −R&D capitalizedt
(4)
Table 11 shows the results after replacing ∆RoA by
∆NetIncome/Assets.
As expected, the slight adjustment in Model 5 does not
change the results fundamentally. ∆NetIncome/Assets is
still negatively significant. However, adjusted R2 increases
by more than 2.4 percentage points up to 0.915 compared
to Model 1. This indicates a very good explanatory power of
the variables included. Consequently, the outcomes suggest
that net income and its change normalized by total assets
before R&D capitalization might even be more important
concerning management’s smoothing target than operating
profitability. Otherwise, the findings equal those in Model 1
and Model 4 in terms of significance and the variables’ coef-
ficient signs except Leverage which is no longer significant.
Also, in this model Manage (related to ∆NetIncome/Assets)
is positively significant with an increasing adjusted R2 (Ap-
pendix 7). Regressing for∆NetIncome/Assets2, which again
looks at one-year changes shows a negative and significant
coefficient with the same adjusted R2 as in Model 5. Thus,
∆NetIncome/Assets can be considered equally important
to managers as ∆NetIncome/Assets2. Manage (related to
∆NetIncome/Assets2) additionally increases explanatory
power by 1 %. The regressions for the second analysis can
be found in Appendix 8.
The last model uses∆EPS as the smoothing variable. It is
calculated by dividing net income before R&D capitalization
by the total number of shares. This measure is introduced
since some prior income smoothing literature suggest to use
EPS as an income smoothing object because of its importance
in annual reports and several analysis (White, 1970).
∆EPSt =
(NetIncomet −R&D capitalizedt)
Total numbers of sharest
−
(NetIncomet−1)
Total numbers of sharest−1 +
(NetIncome−t−2)
Total numbers of sharest−2
2
(5)
Table 12 illustrates the results after replacing ∆RoA by
∆EPS.
The outcomes suggest that ∆EPS is also negatively sig-
nificant as in prior models. Therefore, it can be assumed
that ∆EPS is integrated in managers’ smoothing targets too.
This model indicates the lowest adjusted R2 with 0.856. Even
though explanatory power is still high, it decreased by 3.5 %
compared to Model 1. Like in Model 4 and Model 1, Leverage
becomes significant when taking ESP into account, support-
ing the debt covenant hypothesis. Pre-managed ESP however
is not significant indicating that companies characterized by a
low ESP do not capitalize more to improve their EPS. It seems
that companies are only interested in smooth EPS but are
rather less concerned with the absolute magnitude. Further,
Manage (related to ∆EPS) increases adjusted R2 by nearly
2 % (Appendix 9). As in the previous models, ∆EPS is re-
placed by ∆EPS2 to assess whether base changes or one-
year changes are perceived as more important. ∆EPS2 is
significantly negative associated to R&D capitalization with a
slightly decreasing adjusted R2 compared to Model 6. Man-
age (related to∆EPS2) leads to improved explanatory power
of 3.3 %. The analysis can be found in Appendix 10.
Table 13 summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis.
The outcomes suggest that mangers do not only use operat-
ing profitability as the income smoothing target as assumed
by prior R&D capitalization studies.
Net income as well as EPS are also considered by man-
agers in terms of income smoothing. The findings extend
prior literature on that field since no study investigated R&D
capitalization based on net income or EPS smoothing even
though these variables are highly significant and therefore
have to be taken into account. Additionally, it can be proofed
that companies do not only focus on base numbers but also
consider the change to the prior year. Adding Manage to the
models consistently increases explanatory power indicating
that benchmark-beating ability should always be considered.
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Table 10: Model 4 - Replacing ∆RoA by ∆RoE (own table)
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level ; R = 0.949 / R Square = 0.901/ Adjusted R
Square = 0.874 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0108
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.048 0.012 4.122 0.000 0.025 0.071
∆RoE -0.024** 0.008 -0.164 -3.139 0.002 -0.040 -0.009
RoE -0.025* 0.011 -0.130 -2.342 0.022 -0.046 -0.004
Leverage 0.040** 0.011 0.201 3.598 0.001 0.018 0.062
RDTotal 0.073** 0.021 0.224 3.445 0.001 0.031 0.116
LagCapitalization 0.069** 0.024 0.126 2.829 0.006 0.020 0.117
HighCapitalizer 0.002 0.003 0.029 0.507 0.614 -0.005 0.009
Size -0.007** 0.001 -0.564 -6.690 0.000 -0.010 -0.005
Growth 0.002 0.014 0.007 0.127 0.899 -0.026 0.030
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 -0.038 -0.766 0.446 -0.001 0.001
Table 11: Model 5 - Replacing ∆RoA by ∆NetIncome/Assets (own table)
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level ; R = 0.966 / R Square = 0.933/ Adjusted R
Square = 0.915 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0089
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.059 0.011 5.251 0.000 0.037 0.082
∆NetIncome/Assets -0.154** 0.051 -0.220 -3.036 0.003 -0.254 -0.053
NetIncome/Assets -0.201** 0.059 -0.284 -3.386 0.001 -0.319 -0.083
Leverage 0.005 0.013 0.024 0.367 0.715 -0.021 0.031
RDTotal 0.059** 0.019 0.181 3.175 0.002 0.022 0.097
LagCapitalization 0.058** 0.020 0.107 2.889 0.005 0.018 0.099
HighCapitalizer 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.069 0.945 -0.005 0.006
Size -0.006** 0.001 -0.430 -5.997 0.000 -0.008 -0.004
Growth 0.007 0.012 0.027 0.638 0.525 -0.016 0.031
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 -0.015 -0.357 0.722 -0.001 0.001
Table 12: Model 6 - Replacing ∆RoA by ∆EPS (own table)
The regession controls for years and industries; **Significant at the 0.01 level / *Significant at the 0.05 level ; R = 0.942 / R Square = 0.887/ Adjusted R
Square = 0.856 / Std. Error of the Estimate = 0.0117
Unstandardized Standardized 95% Confidence
Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B
B Std. Error Beta t Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound
(Constant) 0.066 0.016 4.019 0.000 0.033 0.098
∆EPS -0.001** 0.000 -0.119 -2.609 0.011 -0.001 0.000
EPS 0.001 0.000 0.092 1.415 0.161 0.000 0.002
Leverage 0.056** 0.011 0.284 5.249 0.000 0.035 0.078
RDTotal 0.076** 0.023 0.231 3.359 0.001 0.031 0.121
LagCapitalization 0.081** 0.026 0.148 3.067 0.003 0.028 0.133
HighCapitalizer 0.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.059 0.953 -0.008 0.007
Size -0.009** 0.001 -0.693 -7.846 0.000 -0.011 -0.007
Growth -0.017 0.015 -0.063 -1.190 0.238 -0.046 0.012
GrowthExpectation 0.000 0.000 -0.052 -0.976 0.333 -0.001 0.001
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Table 13: Summary of results of sensitivity analysis (own table)
Variables Result Significance level Adjusted R Square
∆RoA significantly negative 0.018 0.891
∆RoA (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.019 0.909
∆RoA2 insignificantly negative 0.074 0.887
∆RoA2 (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.023 0.897
∆RoE significantly negative 0.002 0.874
∆RoE (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.007 0.881
∆RoE2 significantly negative 0.000 0.877
∆RoE2 (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.001 0.885
∆NetIncome/Assets significantly negative 0.003 0.915
∆NetIncome/Assets (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.008 0.920
∆NetIncome/Assets2 significantly negative 0.003 0.915
∆NetIncome/Assets2 (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.002 0.926
∆EPS significantly negative 0.011 0.856
∆ESP (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.001 0.873
∆EPS2 significantly negative 0.033 0.852
∆ESP2 (inc. Manage) significantly negative 0.018 0.885
8. Limitations and further research potential
Even though the analysis proofed that managers engage
in income smoothing through R&D accounting discretion,
there are some limitations of the research that have to be
regarded.
First, the thesis only focuses on accrual-based earnings
management to smooth income while neglecting real earn-
ings management, even though prior studies indicate that the
latter does influence R&D expenditures (Cazavan-Jeny et al.,
2011; Markarian et al., 2008; Osma and Young, 2009; Sey-
bert, 2010; Tahinakis, 2014). If it is assumed that managers
prefer to regulate their income by adopting R&D expendi-
tures rather than change R&D capitalization ratio, this would
impair the results leading to a lower association between
the variables expatiated and R&D capitalization (Markarian
et al., 2008). Since IFRS’s aim is to provide decision useful
information, primary to investors, it supports investor protec-
tion. Hence, companies might choose to favor real earnings
management since this is less observable than accrual-based
earnings management (Enomoto et al., 2015).
Second, R&D related data has to be collected by hand.
This is very time consuming and therefore leads to a relatively
low sample size. Additionally, data collection was partly re-
stricted by disclosing issues, since not all companies publish
their R&D numbers concretely and therefore have to be ex-
cluded from the sample. Beside of the very elaborate prese-
lection of companies that are suitable for the analysis over the
examined period, the elimination of the companies which do
not disclose R&D numbers appropriately might cause a po-
tential bias in the results since these companies could also
be engaged in earnings management (Persson and Fuentes,
2011).
Additionally, the analysis only focuses on German listed
companies which limits the validity to only one country.
Since research results on that topic are quite diverse and
vary by the country examined, further research could ex-
plore how the findings change if the analysis is conducted
including multiple countries. The prevailing accounting and
financial conditions as well as the level of control and reg-
ulation in a country might influence managers’ accounting
behavior and targets. Especially developing countries with
rising R&D intensity and globalization effects could be in-
teresting to observe in the future. Another possible research
topic could be based on a comparison between two countries
that differ in how to account for R&D. If a country with R&D
capitalization options is opposed to a country that demands
expensing of all R&D, the results determine the importance
and role of accruals (Garanina et al., 2016; Triki-Damak and
Halioui, 2013).
Further, there are some mediating and moderating ef-
fects that were not considered and might alter the results.
The thesis does not incorporate the economic situation in
the years examined even though it is possible that the ac-
counting behavior of companies changes based on economic
development (Garanina et al., 2016; Persson and Fuentes,
2011). In addition, it would be worth to consider Wang
et al. (2017) suggestion that family-owned companies tend
to show a higher quality of earnings than other stock compa-
nies. Consequently, it could be assumed that family owned
business are less engaged in earnings management. Other
factors that are suggested to influence the results are board
size and its independence as these are considered as influenc-
ing factors in terms of monitoring effectiveness. The smaller
the board and the higher its independence the better the as-
sociated monitoring quality. It could be assumed that a bet-
ter monitoring quality allows for less earnings management
through accounting discretion (Klein, 2002; Makar et al.,
2000; Vafeas, 2000). Another aspect of interest might be the
compensation of executives since the bonus plan hypothesis
suggests that managers conduct earnings management to in-
crease their personal wealth if their compensation is based
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on accounting numbers (Garanina et al., 2016; Triki-Damak
and Halioui, 2013; Makar et al., 2000). The analysis also
neglects the role of auditors. The quality of audit might be
an additional variable of interest since a detailed and good
external audit allows for less earnings management possibil-
ities. However, it is difficult to quantify a high or low audit
quality (Triki-Damak and Halioui, 2013; Othman and Zéghal,
2006). In fact, these factors are not considered because they
are mostly not disclosed in the annual reports of the com-
panies examined. Despite the fact that all these potentially
influential factors are not included, the explanatory power of
the present analysis is very high (always above 80 %) indi-
cating that most of the significant variables that determine
R&D capitalization behavior have already been identified.
9. Conclusion
The thesis examines whether managers of German listed
companies use the flexibility to capitalize R&D expenditures
given by IAS 38 to engage in income smoothing in terms of
accrual-based earnings management. It is argued that there
is a negative relationship between the companies’ change in
operating profitability and R&D capitalization.
To investigate the association between R&D capitalization
and income smoothing, a multiple linear regression analysis
is performed including relevant control variables. The out-
comes support the established hypothesis, since∆RoA shows
a negative and significant coefficient. This proofs that man-
agers do conduct earnings management through R&D capi-
talization to smooth their incomes. Further, a set of sensitiv-
ity analysis is conducted. The findings indicate that the hy-
pothesis is still confirmed even if benchmark-beating ability is
considered. Explanatory power even increases when adding
the new variable. Additionally, the analysis proofs that oper-
ating profitability could not presumed to be the only income
smoothing target since∆RoE,∆NetIncome/Assets and∆EPS
are significant as well. This extends prior literature as they
only focus on operating profitability. Further, the results sug-
gest that income smoothing could refer to base profits as well
as to profits of the prior year.
The analysis contributes to the convergence project be-
tween the United States Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (US-GAAP) and IFRS, signed in 2002 (Cheney, 2017).
It supports the view of FASB arguing that R&D capitaliza-
tion opportunities pave the way for earnings management
and thus impair objectivity of financial statements (Cazavan-
Jeny et al., 2011; Healy et al., 2002; Lev and Sougiannis,
1996). However, while full expensing of R&D prevents man-
agers from accrual-based earnings management, it could not
be ensured that companies will not conduct real earnings
management by adjusting their total amount of R&D invest-
ments made, according to current performance. If compa-
nies reduce their R&D spending in times of low profitability
this is counterproductive since new technologies might help
them to improve their business. Hence, US-GAAP might pre-
vent companies from investing in R&D even though these in-
vestments are vital for today’s companies to survive. In con-
sequence, FASB and ISAB have to find a way of accounting
practice that does not impair objectivity, maintain reliability
and support R&D investments since a knowledge-based so-
ciety forces companies to come up with new developments
and improvements. To reach that, standard setters, politics
and the companies itself have to work together to cope with
the technology-caused structural change that is currently ob-
served in the economy.
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